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Abstract
In the presence of an endogenous binary treatment and a valid binary instru-
ment, causal effects are point identified only for the subpopulation of compliers, given
that the treatment is monotone in the instrument. With the exception of the entire
population, causal inference for further subpopulations has been widely ignored in
econometrics. We invoke treatment monotonicity and/or dominance assumptions to
derive sharp bounds on the average treatment effects on the treated, as well as on
other groups. Furthermore, we use our methods to assess the educational impact of a
school voucher program in Colombia and discuss testable implications of our assump-
tions.
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1 Introduction
Endogeneity of the (binary) treatment variable and noncompliance to the treatment
assignment in randomized experiments are widespread phenomena in the evaluation of
treatment effects, see for instance Bloom (1984). Given a valid instrumental variable
(IV) that is randomly assigned and has no direct effect on the mean potential outcomes
and (weakly) positive monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument, Imbens and
Angrist (1994) (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996) show that the average
treatment effect (ATE) is only identified in the subpopulation of compliers. The
latter correspond to those whose the treatment status is equal to (i.e. reacts on) the
instrument if both the treatment and the instrument are binary.
Whether the LATE is a relevant parameter heavily depends on the empirical con-
text and has been controversially discussed in the literature, see for instance Imbens
(2009), Deaton (2010), and Heckman and Urzu´a (2010). Typically, researchers would
like to identify the ATEs on the treated or the entire population. Note that these
parameters are themselves weighted averages of the ATEs on several subpopulations,
including the always takers (always treated irrespective of the instrument) and the
never takers (never treated irrespective of the instrument). Maybe due to the fact
that in a nonparametric framework, point identification is generally not feasible for
the never takers, always takers, the treated, and the entire population (unless the
complier share is 100 %), groups other than the compliers have (apart from the entire
population) been widely ignored in the econometric literature.1
The main contribution of this paper is to derive nonparametric bounds on ATEs
of populations that are potentially more policy relevant than the LATE on the com-
pliers, which may not be externally valid. In particular, we also consider the treated
population, which is of major interest in the program evaluation literature to assess
the program effects on actual participants. In contrast to the commonly invoked full
independence between the instrument and the potential outcomes/treatment states,
we only assume mean independence between the instrument and the potential out-
comes (within subpopulations) as well as the subpopulations. Moreover, we discuss
1An exception is Fro¨lich and Lechner (2010) who also point identify the ATEs on the always takers and
never takers. To this end, they invoke both IV and selection on observables (or conditional independence,
see for instance Imbens, 2004) assumptions. However, this identification strategy stands in contrast to
virtually all other IV applications, where an instrument is used exactly for the reason that no other source
of identification (such as selection on observables) is available.
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the identifying power of (i) monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument and/or
(ii) mean dominance of the potential outcomes of one subpopulation over the others.
Monotonicity and dominance, either w.r.t. the mean or to the entire distribution (i.e.,
stochastic dominance), have also been considered in a different context, namely under
non-random sample selection and attrition, see for instance Zhang and Rubin (2003),
Lechner and Melly (2007), Blundell et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008), and Lee (2009),
and Huber and Mellace (2013a). We use the principal stratification framework sug-
gested by Frangakis and Rubin (2002) to derive sharp bounds for the ATEs on the
always takers, never takers, the treated, the non-treated, and the entire population.2
As a further contribution, we find testable implications of the IV mean independence
within subpopulations and mean dominance when monotonicity is invoked.
Partial identification of economic parameters in general goes back to Manski (1989,
1994) and Robins (1989). Previous work on nonparametric bounds under treatment
endogeneity, which is the problem considered here, has almost exclusively focused on
the ATE in the entire population,3 but neglected further populations. E.g., Manski
(1990) bounds the ATE by solely relying on independence between the mean potential
outcomes and the instrument.4 Considering binary outcomes, Balke and Pearl (1997)
provide sharp bounds for the ATE under full (rather than mean) independence between
the instrument and the potential values of the treatment (given the instrument) and
the outcome (given the treatment) with and without monotonicity (see also Dawid,
2003) of the treatment in the instrument. Shaikh and Vytlacil (2011) bound the ATE
on the entire population in the binary outcome case under monotonicity, too, and
assume the treatment effect to be either weakly positive or weakly negative for all
individuals (while the direction is a priori not restricted). See Bhattacharya et al.
(2008) for an application. Cheng and Small (2006) extend the results for binary
outcomes to three treatments (in contrast to the standard binary treatment framework
considered here) under particular forms of (one-sided) noncompliance. Richardson and
Robins (2010) is the only study apart from ours that also bounds the effects on further
populations (compliers, defiers, never takers, and always takers). They assume full
2In addition, online Appendix A.8 provides the bounds for the treated subpopulations receiving and
not receiving the instrument.
3For the derivation of semiparametric bounds on the ATE on the entire population, see Chiburis (2010)
and the references therein.
4As it is the aim of this paper to provide bounds for further populations, we also need to assume that
the proportions of the subpopulations are independent of the instrument, otherwise the bounds on those
populations might differ for different values of the instrument.
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independence and a binary outcome, but do not consider monotonicity or any form of
mean dominance.
In contrast to much of the epidemiologic literature, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001)
and Kitagawa (2009) allow for both discrete and continuous outcomes. Kitagawa
(2009) partially identifies the potential outcome distributions for the entire popula-
tion under (various forms of) full independence between the instrument and potential
treatments/outcomes as well as monotonicity and derives bounds on the ATE. Also
Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) assume full independence of the instrument, but invoke
a nonparametric threshold crossing model characterizing the treatment choice instead
of monotonicity for deriving the bounds on the ATE. However, by the results of Vyt-
lacil (2002), both approaches are equivalent. One interesting finding of Heckman and
Vytlacil (2001) and Kitagawa (2009) is that the width of their bounds is the same
as those of Manski (1990), given that the monotonicity/threshold crossing model as-
sumptions are satisfied. The present work adds to the literature on nonparametric
bounds under endogeneity by considering more populations and an extended set of
identifying assumptions than any of the previous studies.
The identifying power of monotonicity and mean dominance is demonstrated in
an empirical application to Colombia’s “Programa de Ampliacio´n de Cobertura de la
Educacio´n Secundaria”, which provided pupils from low income families with vouch-
ers for private secondary schooling. Using experimental data previously analyzed by
Angrist et al. (2002), we aim at assessing the program’s impact on the educational
achievement of various subpopulations. In particular, we find (in addition to the point
identified complier effect) a significantly positive ATE on the treated which lies within
reasonably tight bounds. This is an interesting result because it suggests that this and
similar interventions have a positive effect on the participants, who are likely more
policy relevant than the latent population of compliers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes the
endogeneity/noncompliance problem based on principal stratification. Section 3 dis-
cusses the identifying assumptions and derives bounds on the ATEs for various popula-
tions. Section 4 briefly presents the estimators. In Section 5, we consider an empirical
application to experimental education data. Section 6 concludes.
3
2 Using principal stratification to characterize non-
compliance
Suppose that we want to estimate the effect of a binary treatment D ∈ {1, 0} (e.g., a
training activity) on an outcome Y (e.g., labor market success such as employment or
earnings) evaluated at some point in time after the treatment. We use the experimental
framework to motivate the problems of endogeneity and noncompliance. Assume that
individuals are randomly assigned into treatment or non-treatment according to the
binary assignment variable Z ∈ {1, 0}, which will serve as instrument. Denote by
Di(z) the potential treatment state for Z = z and by Yi(d) the potential outcome
(see for instance Rubin, 1974) of individual i under treatment D = d. Throughout
the discussion we will rule out interference between individuals or general equilibrium
effects of the treatment by invoking the “Stable Unit Treatment Value assumption”
(SUTVA), see for instance Rubin (1990). The SUTVA is formalized in Assumption 1:
Assumption 1:
Yi(d)⊥dj and Di(z)⊥zj ∀j 6= i, d ∈ {0, 1} (SUTVA).
Even under Assumption 1, the individual effect Yi(1)− Yi(0) can never be evaluated
as individual i is either treated or not treated, but cannot be observed in both states.
I.e., the observed outcome Yi = Di ·Yi(1) + (1−Di) ·Yi(0). However, under particular
assumptions aggregate parameters such as the average treatment effect (ATE) ∆ =
E[Y (1)]−E[Y (0)] can be identified. E.g., assume that compliance in an experiment is
perfect such that Di(1) = 1 and Di(0) = 0 for all individuals i. In this case and under
successful randomization, E[Y |Z = 1] − E[Y |Z = 0] = E[Y |D = 1] − E[Y |D = 0] =
E[Y (1)]− E[Y (0)] = ∆, where the first equality follows from perfect compliance and
the second from random assignment. I.e., the ATE is identified because all individuals
are compliers. However, if post-assignment complications occur such that Di(z) 6= z
for some z and some individuals i, selection bias may flaw the validity of the evaluation
in spite of the randomization of the assignment. This is due to the potential threat
that individuals systematically select themselves into the treatment according to their
potential outcomes.
Using the principal stratification framework advocated by Frangakis and Rubin
(2002), the population can be divided into four principal strata, denoted by T , ac-
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cording to the choice of D as a reaction of Z. Angrist et al. (1996) refer to the four
groups as (i) compliers, who react on the instrument in the intended way by taking the
treatment when Z = 1 and abstaining from it when Z = 0, (ii) always takers, who are
always treated irrespective of the assignment, (iii) never takers, who are never treated
irrespective of the assignment, and (iv) defiers, who are treated when not assigned,
but not treated when assigned. Table 1 visualizes this definition.
Table 1: Principal strata
Principal strata (T ) D(1) D(0) Notion
11 1 1 Always takers
10 1 0 Compliers
01 0 1 Defiers
00 0 0 Never takers
It is obvious that we cannot directly observe the principal stratum an individual
belongs to as either D(1) or D(0) is known. Therefore, without the imposition of
further assumptions, neither the principal strata proportions nor the distribution of Y
within any stratum are identified. To see this, note that the observed values of Z and
D generate four observed subgroups which are all mixtures of two principal strata.
This implies that any individual i with a particular combination of Zi, Di may belong
to two principal strata, see Table 2.
Table 2: Observed subgroups and principal strata
Observed subgroups principal strata
{i : Zi = 1, Di = 1} subject i belongs either to 11 or to 10
{i : Zi = 1, Di = 0} subject i belongs either to 01 or to 00
{i : Zi = 0, Di = 1} subject i belongs either to 11 or to 01
{i : Zi = 0, Di = 0} subject i belongs either to 10 or to 00
As second identifying restriction maintained throughout the paper, we will assume
Z to be independent of (i) the mean potential outcomes within principal strata and
(ii) of the strata proportions, which has also been considered in Fro¨lich (2007):
Assumption 2:
(i) E(Y (d)|T = t, Z = 1) = E(Y (d)|T = t, Z = 0) = E(Y (d)|T = t) for d ∈ {0, 1} and
t ∈ {11, 10, 01, 00} (mean independence within principal strata),
(ii) Pr(T = t|Z = 1) = Pr(T = t|Z = 0) = Pr(T = t) for t ∈ {11, 10, 01, 00}
(unconfounded strata proportions).
Assumption 2 (i) postulates that mere assignment does not have any direct effect on
the mean potential outcomes within any stratum other than through the treatment,5
5However, in contrast to the full independence considered in Imbens and Angrist (1994) and Angrist
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i.e. mean independence within principal strata.6 Taking assignment to a training as
an example, it rules out that the average labor market success given T changes as a
reaction to merely being assigned. I.e., what should matter is whether the training is
actually received. By Assumption 2 (ii), the proportion of any stratum conditional on
the instrument is equal to its unconditional proportion in the entire population. This
holds for instance under random assignment, where Z is fully independent of the joint
distribution of (D(1), D(0)) and thus, of T . Alternatively to the unconditional validity
of Assumption 2, one may assume that it only holds conditional on some observed pre-
assignment variables X. This is closely related to the framework of Fro¨lich (2007) who
shows point identification of the LATE under a conditionally valid instrument (given
X). In the further discussion, conditioning on X will be kept implicit, such that all
results either refer to the experimental framework or to an analysis within cells of X.
Unfortunately, even under Assumptions 1 and 2, point identification is not ob-
tained. Let pit = Pr(T = t) denote a particular proportion and Pd|z ≡ Pr(D =
d|Z = z) the observed treatment probability conditional on assignment status. Under
Assumption 2 (ii), which ensures that the strata proportions conditional on the in-
strument are equal to the unconditional strata proportions, the relation between the
observed Pd|z and the latent pit is as displayed in Table 3. Likewise, any observed
Table 3: Observed probabilities and principal strata proportions
Observed cond. treatment prob. princ. strata proportions
P1|1 = Pr(D = 1|Z = 1) pi11 + pi10
P0|1 = Pr(D = 0|Z = 1) pi01 + pi00
P1|0 = Pr(D = 1|Z = 0) pi11 + pi01
P0|0 = Pr(D = 0|Z = 0) pi10 + pi00
conditional mean outcome is a mixture of the mean outcomes of two strata. E.g.,
E(Y |Z = 1, D = 1) = pi11
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y |Z = 1, D = 1, T = 11)
+
pi10
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y |Z = 1, D = 1, T = 10),
=
pi11
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y |D = 1, T = 11) + pi10
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y |D = 1, T = 10),
=
pi11
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y (1)|T = 11) + pi10
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y (1)|T = 10),
where the second equality follows from Assumption 2 (i) and the third from the fact
et al. (1996), it may affect higher moments.
6For the case that mean independence is not satisfied, Flores and Flores-Lagunes (2013) derive bounds
on the LATE in the presence of an invalid instrument. In contrast, we will assume the instrument to be
valid (in the sense that it satisfies Assumption 2) throughout the discussion.
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that the treatment is unconfounded within each stratum consisting of individuals with
identical (non-)compliance behavior.
Thus, point identification of causal effects would require us to invoke further as-
sumptions. E.g., under monotonicity of D in Z and effect homogeneity, the ATE on
the entire population is identified. Albeit used in much of the IV literature, effect
homogeneity is a very unattractive assumption given the rich empirical evidence on
effect heterogeneity in the field of treatment evaluation. Under monotonicity and ef-
fect heterogeneity, the LATE on the compliers is identified, but this effect may be
“too local” to be of policy interest. Fortunately, assumptions as monotonicity and
mean dominance also bear identifying power for further populations and may yield
informative bounds, as discussed in the next section.
3 Assumptions and interval identification
3.1 Mean independence within principal strata without fur-
ther assumptions
The partial identification of ATEs on various populations will be based on bounding
the mean potential outcomes E(Y (1)|T = t), E(Y (0)|T = t), with t ∈ {11, 10, 00, 01}.
To this end, we assume that the support Y of the outcome variable Y is bounded,
i.e., Y = [yLB , yUB ] with −∞ < yLB < yUB < ∞, and that Y is continuous over Y
(see online Appendix A.5 for discrete outcomes). Boundedness of Y rules out infinite
upper or lower bounds on the mean potential outcomes and thus, on the ATE in
any population. We will refer to the bounds on any ATE as being informative if its
identification region does not coincide with (i.e. is tighter than) [yLB−yUB , yUB−yLB ].
Partial identification is obtained in three steps. In the first step, we derive sharp
bounds on the principal strata proportions using Assumption 2 (ii). As one can
express three out of four proportions as a function of the remaining one, we only need
to bound the latter. Therefore, all bounds are computed as functions of the defier
proportion, but choosing any other principal stratum would entail the same results.
The second step (which is mostly discussed in the online appendix) gives the bounds
on the mean potential outcomes and the ATEs conditional on the defier proportion.
It makes use of the fact that each observed conditional mean outcome is a mixture
of the mean potential outcomes of two principal strata, with the mixing probabilities
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corresponding to the relative principal strata proportions:
E(Y |Z = 1, D = 1) = pi11
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y (1)|T = 11) + pi10
pi11 + pi10
· E(Y (1)|T = 10),(1)
E(Y |Z = 0, D = 1) = pi11
pi11 + pi01
· E(Y (1)|T = 11) + pi01
pi11 + pi01
· E(Y (1)|T = 01),(2)
E(Y |Z = 0, D = 0) = pi10
pi00 + pi10
· E(Y (0)|T = 10) + pi00
pi00 + pi10
· E(Y (0)|T = 00),(3)
E(Y |Z = 1, D = 0) = pi01
pi00 + pi01
· E(Y (0)|T = 01) + pi00
pi00 + pi01
· E(Y (0)|T = 00).(4)
Given the defier proportion (and thus, the mixing probabilities), the results of Horowitz
and Manski (1995) (see Section 3.2 and Proposition 4 therein) provide us with sharp
bounds on the mean potential outcomes within each of equations (1) to (4), whereas
Assumption 2 (i) allows further tightening these bounds across equations. Using an
approach inspired by Kitagawa (2009), we derive sharp bounds on the mean potential
outcomes and the ATEs under Assumption 2 (i) and conditional on the defier propor-
tion. Finally, taking the supremum (infimum) of the ATEs in the second step over
admissible defier proportions that satisfy Assumption 2 (ii) yields the sharp upper
(lower) bounds on the ATEs (see online Appendix A.1.2).7 As the bounds are contin-
uous in pi01 (as shown in online Appendix A.1.4) and the set of admissible shares of
defiers is an interval (as shown in Lemma 1), the optima are attained by the extreme
value theorem.
Concerning the bounds on the defier proportion, note that under Assumptions 1
and 2, Table 3 provides us with the following equations:
pi11 = P1|0 − pi01 ⇒ pi01 ≤ P1|0,
pi00 = P0|1 − pi01 ⇒ pi01 ≤ P0|1, (5)
pi10 = P1|1 − P1|0 + pi01 ⇒ pi01 ≥ P1|0 − P1|1,
and thus, the defier proportion must lie in the following set
pi01 ∈ P = [max(0, P1|0 − P1|1),min(P1|0, P0|1)]. (6)
Note that these bounds are valid outer bounds, but they need not be sharp. Sharp
bounds on the proportion of defiers have to be constructed based on the joint dis-
7It is worth noting that without further restrictions, it is generally not possible that one particular
value of pi01 jointly optimizes the bounds on all ATEs considered.
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tribution of (Y,D,Z), rather than (D,Z) alone. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the
condition pi01 = 0 leads to testable implications as studied in Huber and Mellace
(2013b). However, in some cases zero may not be in the identified set of the defier
share. In online Appendix A.1.3, we show that admissibility of pi01 is equivalent to
checking four moment inequalites that generalize those inequalities outlined in Hu-
ber and Mellace (2013b). Furthermore, online Appendix A.1.1 presents a linear pro-
gramming procedure for constructing sharp bounds on pi01 in the case of a discrete
Y .8 Under discreteness, linear programming can also be used for constructing sharp
bounds on various types of ATEs as it was first pointed out by Balke and Pearl (1997).
This work was further extended to the case with continuous outcomes by Kitagawa
(2009), who derived a closed-form solution for the sharp bounds (rather than relying
on linear programming). Laffe´rs (2013) applied linear programming to bound ATEs
under various sets of assumptions.
We denote by pimint and pi
max
t the sharp lower and upper bounds of pit, t =
11, 10, 01, 00, respectively, and by P∗ the sharp identified set for pi01 under Assump-
tions 1 and 2. In online Appendix A.1.1, we show that P∗ is an interval. If P = P∗,
then the remaining strata proportions can be bounded by substituting (6) into (5).
It is easy to see that either pimin01 = 0 or pi
min
10 = 0 and either pi
min
11 = 0 or pi
min
00 = 0.
The outer bounds P are equivalent to those derived in Richardson and Robins (2010)
(equation (6) of Section 3.1, page 9). In contrast to their paper we only assume mean
independence within principal strata in Assumption 2, rather than full independence.
In order to bound the ATEs on the four populations, we introduce some additional
notation. We define Y¯z,d = E(Y |Z = z,D = d) to be the conditional mean of Y given
Z = z and D = d. Furthermore, FYz,d(y) = Pr(Y ≤ y|Z = z,D = d) denotes the
conditional cdf of Y given Z = z andD = d. Let qtz,d denote the share of individuals be-
longing to stratum T = t in the observed subgroup with Z = z andD = d. If necessary,
we will denote by q
t,pimax01
z,d and q
t,pimin01
z,d , the value of q
t
z,d when pi01 is equal to pi
max
01 or pi
min
01 ,
respectively. Let F−1Yz,d(q
t
z,d) = inf{y : FYz,d(y) ≥ qtz,d}9 be the conditional quantile
function of Y given Z = z and D = d. We can then define the lower and upper bounds
of E(Y |Z = z,D = d, T = t), which by Assumption 2 corresponds to E(Y (d)|T =
t) (see Section 2), as Y¯z,d(min |qtz,d) = E(Y |Z = z,D = d, Y ≤ F−1Yz,d(qtz,d)) and
8We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the difference between P and P∗ and for suggesting
the linear programming tool.
9We define F−1Yz,d(0) ≡ yLB and F
−1
Yz,d
(1) ≡ yUB .
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Y¯z,d(max |qtz,d) ≡ E(Y |Z = z,D = d, Y ≥ F−1Yz,d(1 − qtz,d)), respectively. Finally, the
ATEs on the various principal strata, the treated, the non-treated, and the entire
population are denoted by ∆t ≡ E(Y (1) − Y (0)|T = t) with t ∈ {11, 10, 01, 00},
∆D=d ≡ E(Y (1) − Y (0)|D = d) with d ∈ {1, 0}, and ∆ ≡ E(Y (1) − Y (0)), respec-
tively. The superscripts “UB” and “LB” denote the sharp upper and lower bounds
on the respective parameters, where sharpness of the bounds on some parameter ∆˜ is
defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given the knowledge of the distribution of the observed data, ∆˜LB
and ∆˜UB are sharp if [∆˜LB , ∆˜UB ] is the shortest interval such that, for every ∆˜ ∈
[∆˜LB , ∆˜UB ], we can construct principal strata proportions Pr(T |Z) : T = 11, 10, 01, 00,
Z = 1, 0 and potential outcome distributions f(Y (1), Y (0)|T,Z) : T = 11, 10, 01, 00,
Z = 1, 0 that satisfy the imposed assumptions.
Considering the ATE on the compliers (∆10), if P1|0 − P1|1 /∈ P∗, then the upper
and lower bounds are, respectively,
∆UB10 = sup
pi01∈P∗
[
P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − (P1|0 − pi01) ·max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q111,1), Y¯0,1(min |q110,1)
)
P1|1 − P1|0 + pi01
− P0|0 · Y¯0,0 − (P0|1 − pi01) ·min
(
Y¯0,0(max |q000,0), Y¯1,0(max |q001,0)
)
P1|1 − P1|0 + pi01
]
,
∆LB10 = inf
pi01∈P∗
[
P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − (P1|0 − pi01) ·min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q111,1), Y¯0,1(max |q110,1)
)
P1|1 − P1|0 + pi01
− P0|0 · Y¯0,0 − (P0|1 − pi01) ·max
(
Y¯0,0(min |q000,0), Y¯1,0(min |q001,0)
)
P1|1 − P1|0 + pi01
]
,
(7)
where q111,1 =
P1|0−pi01
P1|1
(the share of always takers among those with Z = 1 and D = 1),
q110,1 =
P1|0−pi01
P1|0
(the share of always takers among those with Z = 0 and D = 1),
q001,0 =
P0|1−pi01
P0|1
(the share of never takers among those with Z = 0 and D = 1), and
q000,0 =
P0|1−pi01
P0|0
(the share of never takers among those with Z = 0 and D = 0). The
proofs of the sharpness of these bounds as well as of any other bounds proposed below
are provided in the online appendix. If pi01 = P1|0 − P1|1 ∈ P∗, then pi10 = 0 and the
bounds are uninformative. Therefore, ∆UB10 = y
UB − yLB and ∆LB10 = yLB − yUB . In
online Appendix A.1.4, we show that ∆UB(pi01) and ∆
LB(pi01) are continuous in pi01.
Four points are worth noting concerning the derivation of these bounds. Firstly
and as already mentioned, they make use of Proposition 4 of Horowitz and Manski
(1995), which in general only holds for continuous outcomes. Fortunately, it is easy to
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show that their results can also be applied to discrete outcomes after a modification of
the trimming function, see online Appendix A.5 for further details. Secondly, (7) has
to be optimized w.r.t. admissible defier proportions, given by P∗. Thirdly, mean inde-
pendence within strata (Assumption 2 (i)) gives rise to the maximum and minimum
operators. Note that in the first (third) line in (7) one computes the upper (lower)
bound of the compliers’ mean potential outcome under treatment by subtracting the
lower (upper) bound of the mean potential outcome of the always takers. As their
lower (upper) bound under treatment is not affected by the value of Z due to mean
independence, the lower (upper) bound is the maximum (minimum) of the always
takers’ lower (upper) bounds for Z = 1 and Z = 0. An analogous result holds for lines
2 and 4 w.r.t. the bounds on the potential mean outcomes under non-treatment of the
never takers. Finally, if P = P∗, these bounds are informative only if P1|0 < P1|1.
This is equivalent to pi10 > pi01, saying that the share of compliers is larger than the
share of defiers. The reason is that if P1|0 ≥ P1|1, then pimin01 = P1|0 − P1|1 > 0, which
implies that pimin10 = 0 (so that the non-existence of compliers cannot be ruled out)
and ∆UB10 = y
UB − yLB , ∆LB10 = yUB − yLB .
In a symmetric way one obtains the sharp upper and lower bounds on the ATE on
the defiers, ∆01. If 0 /∈ P∗:
∆UB01 = sup
pi01∈P∗
[
P1|0 · Y¯0,1 − (P1|0 − pi01) ·max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q111,1), Y¯0,1(min |q110,1)
)
pi01
− P0|1 · Y¯1,0 − (P0|1 − pi01) ·min
(
Y¯0,0(max |q000,0), Y¯1,0(max |q001,0)
)
pi01
]
,
∆LB01 = inf
pi01∈P∗
[
P1|0 · Y¯0,1 − (P1|0 − pi01) ·min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q111,1), Y¯0,1(max |q110,1)
)
pi01
− P0|1 · Y¯1,0 − (P0|1 − pi01) ·max
(
Y¯0,0(min |q000,0), Y¯1,0(min |q001,0)
)
pi01
]
,
(8)
For the same reason mentioned above, if P = P∗, these bounds are informative
only if P1|0 > P1|1, i.e., if there are more defiers than compliers. Therefore, without
imposing further assumptions, the bounds are informative either for the defiers or for
the compliers, but never for both populations. Furthermore, unless either P1|1−P1|0 =
0 or P 6= P∗, either positive (if P1|1 − P1|0 > 0) or negative (if P1|0 − P1|1 > 0)
monotonicity of D in Z can be consistent with the data, but not both at the same
time.
Concerning the always takers, note that their outcomes are only observed under
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treatment. The shares of always takers in the observed groups with Z = 1, D = 1 and
Z = 0, D = 1 are, respectively, pi11/(pi11 + pi10) = (P1|0 − pi01)/P1|1 and pi11/(pi11 +
pi01) = (P1|0 − pi01)/P1|0. Therefore, we can bound the upper and lower values of the
mean potential outcome under treatment for this population by min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q11,pi
max
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(max |q11,pi
max
01
0,1 )
)
and max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q11,pi
max
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(min |q11,pi
max
01
0,1 )
)
, respectively. As already discussed,
the intuition for the optimization over different values of the instrument is that Z
does not have a direct effect on the mean potential outcomes. Therefore, the set of
admissible potential outcomes for D = 1 is the intersection of possible values under
Z = 0 and Z = 1.
Since the outcomes of the always takers are never observed under non-treatment,
we have to rely on the upper and lower bounds in the support of Y , yUB and yLB .
The sharp upper and lower bounds for the ATE on the always takers ∆11, are:
∆UB11 = min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q11,pi
max
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(max |q11,pi
max
01
0,1 )
)
− yLB ,
∆LB11 = max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q11,pi
max
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(min |q11,pi
max
01
0,1 )
)
− yUB .
It is easy to see10 that pimax01 maximizes the upper bound and minimizes the lower
bound of ∆11 w.r.t. pi01, so that q
11,pimax01
z,1 = max
(
0,
P1|0−P0|1
P1|z
)
. Similarly as for the
compliers and defiers, these bounds are only informative if P1|0 > P0|1 ⇒ pi11 > pi00,
i.e., if the share of always takers is larger than the share of never takers. The sampling
process constraints the identification region of either the average treatment effect on
the always takers or of the one on the never takers. Once again if P1|0 < P0|1 then
pimax01 = P1|0, which implies that pi
min
11 = 0.
Using a symmetric argument as for the always takers, the sharp upper and lower
bounds on the ATE of the never takers, ∆00, are, respectively:
∆UB00 = y
UB −max
(
Y¯1,0(min |q00,pi
max
01
1,0 ), Y¯0,0(min |q00,pi
max
01
0,0 )
)
,
∆LB00 = y
LB −min
(
Y¯1,0(max |q00,pi
max
01
1,0 ), Y¯0,0(max |q00,pi
max
01
0,0 )
)
.
pimax01 maximizes the upper bound and minimizes the lower bound of ∆00 w.r.t. pi01,
such that q
00,pimax01
z,0 = max
(
0,
P0|1−P1|0
P0|z
)
. The bounds are informative if P1|0 < P0|1,
10Both Y¯1,1(max |q111,1) and Y¯0,1(max |q110,1) are non-decreasing functions of pi01. Similarly, both
Y¯1,1(min |q111,1) and Y¯0,1(min |q110,1) are non-increasing functions of pi01.
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i.e., if there are more never takers than always takers in the population. Similar as
before if P1|0 > P0|1, pimax01 = P0|1 which implies that pi
min
00 = 0.
11
The identification results presented so far refer to latent strata defined by Z and
D, populations that are not directly observed in the data. However, in the program
evaluation literature, most attention seems to be devoted to the (observed) population
receiving the treatment, see for instance Heckman et al. (1999), which generally ap-
pears more policy relevant than latent groups. As a major contribution of this paper,
we therefore also derive sharp bounds on the ATEs on the treated, as well as the non-
treated and the entire population. The discussion below shows that for doing so, it
suffices to establish the sharp bounds on E(Y (1)) and E(Y (0)), which for continuous
outcomes are given by
E(Y (1))UB = (P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yUB − (P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
+ P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1, (9)
E(Y (1))LB = (P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yLB − (P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
+ P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1,
and
E(Y (0))UB = (P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yUB − (P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯0,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
+ P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0, (10)
E(Y (0))LB = (P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yLB − (P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯0,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
+ P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0,
respectively, see online Appendix A.1.5. If Y is not continuous these bounds, and thus
the one on the treated, non-treated, and the entire population, have to be optimized
w.r.t. admissible defier proportions pi01, given by P∗.
Considering the ATE on the treated, ∆D=1 = E(Y (1) − Y (0)|D = 1), note that
because E(Y (1)|D = 1) = E(Y |D = 1) is identified from the data, we only need to
bound E(Y (0)|D = 1). Solving E(Y (0)) = Pr(D = 1) · E(Y (0)|D = 1) + Pr(D = 0) ·
E(Y (0)|D = 0) for E(Y (0)|D = 1) gives E(Y (0)|D = 1) = E(Y (0))−Pr(D=0)·E(Y |D=0)Pr(D=1) .
11This demonstrates that it is generally not possible to have a value of pi01 that jointly optimizes the
bounds on the average treatment effects of all principal strata.
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Letting E(Y (0))UB and E(Y (0))LB denote the sharp upper and lower bounds for
E(Y (0)), respectively, it therefore follows that the sharp upper and lower bounds on
the ATE on the treated ∆D=1 are given by
∆UBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
E(Y (0))LB − Pr(D = 0) · E(Y |D = 0)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆LBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
E(Y (0))UB − Pr(D = 0) · E(Y |D = 0)
Pr(D = 1)
.
Since
Pr(D = 0) · E(Y |D = 0) = Pr(Z = 0) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 1) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0
and
P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0 = Pr(Z = 0) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 1) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0
+ Pr(Z = 1) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0,
= Pr(D = 0) · E(Y |D = 0) + Pr(Z = 1) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0,
the bounds on ∆D=1 correspond to
∆UBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
(P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yLB + Pr(Z = 1) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0
Pr(D = 1)
+
(P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯0,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆LBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
(P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yUB + Pr(Z = 1) · P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P0|1 · Y¯1,0
Pr(D = 1)
+
(P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯0,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
Pr(D = 1)
.
The bounds of the ATE on the non-treated, ∆D=0 = E(Y (1) − Y (0)|D = 0), are
obtained in a symmetric way. As E(Y (0)|D = 0) = E(Y |D = 0) and E(Y (1)|D =
0) = E(Y (1))−Pr(D=1)·E(Y |D=1)Pr(D=0) , they are
∆UBD=0 =
E(Y (1))UB − Pr(D = 1) · E(Y |D = 1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
∆LBD=0 =
E(Y (1))LB − Pr(D = 1) · E(Y |D = 1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0).
Furthermore, since
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Pr(D = 1) · E(Y |D = 1) = Pr(Z = 0) · P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + Pr(Z = 1) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1
and
P1|1 · Y¯1,1 + P1|0 · Y¯0,1 = Pr(Z = 0) · P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + Pr(Z = 1) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1
+ Pr(Z = 1) · P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + Pr(Z = 0) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1
= Pr(D = 1) · E(Y |D = 1) + Pr(Z = 1) · P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + Pr(Z = 0) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1,
the bounds on ∆D=0 are given by
∆UBD=0 =
(P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yUB + Pr(Z = 1) · P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1
Pr(D = 0)
−
(P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
∆LBD=0 =
(P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yLB + Pr(Z = 1) · P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + Pr(Z = 0) · P1|1 · Y¯1,1
Pr(D = 0)
−
(P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0).
Interestingly, the bounds on ∆D=1 and ∆D=0 are always informative despite the fact
that either the bounds for the compliers or the defiers and either the bounds for the
always takers or the never takers are not informative.
Finally, the bounds for the ATE on the entire population ∆ = E(Y (1)−Y (0)) are
directly obtained from the bounds on E(Y (1)) and E(Y (0)) in (9) and (10):
∆UB = E(Y (1)UB − Y (0)LB)
= P1|0 · Y¯0,1 − (P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yLB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1
− (P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(min |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
+ (P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯0,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(max |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
− P0|1 · Y¯1,0 + (P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yUB − P0|0 · Y¯0,0 ,
and
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∆LB = E(Y (1)LB − Y (0)UB)
= P1|0 · Y¯0,1 − (P1|0 − pimin01 ) · yUB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1
− (P1|0 − pimin01 ) ·min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
1,1 ), Y¯0,1(max |q11,pi
min
01
0,1 )
)
+ (P0|1 − pimin01 ) ·max
(
Y¯0,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
0,0 ), Y¯1,0(min |q00,pi
min
01
1,0 )
)
− P0|1 · Y¯1,0 + (P0|1 − pimin01 ) · yLB − P0|0 · Y¯0,0
Again, these bounds are always informative no matter whether the bounds on the
effect in some of the principal strata are not informative. In online Appendix A.1.8
we show that it is possible to order the bounds on ∆D=1, ∆D=0, and ∆ with respect
to their tightness. In particular, if ∆UBD=1 < ∆
UB
D=0 (or equivalently, ∆
LB
D=1 > ∆
LB
D=0),
the bounds on ∆D=1 are tighter than those on ∆, which are in turn tighter than those
on ∆D=0. The order is reversed if ∆
UB
D=1 > ∆
UB
D=0 (or equivalently ∆
LB
D=1 < ∆
LB
D=0).
Furthermore, note that ∆LB , ∆UB might be narrower than the IV bounds derived
by Manski (1990). The reason is that we assume mean independence within strata
and unconfounded strata proportions (see Assumption 2), whereas Manski imposes
the weaker mean independence of the potential outcomes in the entire population:
E(Y (d)|Z = 1) = E(Y (d)|Z = 0) for d ∈ {0, 1}. In contrast, our bounds may be
wider than those of Kitagawa (2009), who invokes the stronger assumption of full
independence of the instrument and the potential treatment states and outcomes. A
formal comparison between the various bounds is given in online Appendices A.1.6
and A.1.7.
Without imposing additional restrictions, the bounds derived in this section are
likely to be very wide for most populations. Therefore, they are often not helpful
for obtaining meaningful results in applications. For this reason we subsequently
introduce further assumptions that appear plausible in many empirical problems and
might entail considerably tighter bounds.
3.2 Monotonicity
This subsection shows how assuming monotonicity of the treatment in the instrument
in addition to Assumption 1 and 2 increases identifying power. (Weak) monotonicity
of D in Z implies that the treatment state under Z = 1 is at least as high as under
Z = 0 for all individuals.
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Assumption 3:
Pr(D(1) ≥ D(0)) = 1 (monotonicity).
As the potential treatment state never decreases in the instrument, the existence of
the defiers (stratum 01) is ruled out. A symmetric result is obtained by assuming
Pr(D(0) ≥ D(1)) = 1 which implies that stratum 10 does not exist. Note that as-
suming Pr(D(1) ≥ D(0)) = 1 (positive monotonicity) is only consistent with the
data if P1|1 − P1|0 > 0, otherwise stratum 01 must necessarily exist. Similarly,
Pr(D(0) ≥ D(1)) = 1 (negative monotonicity) requires that P1|0 − P1|1 > 0, see
Table 3. Even though these are necessary conditions for the respective monotonicity
assumption, they are not sufficient. Due to the symmetry of positive and negative
monotonicity, we will only focus on Assumption 3 (positive monotonicity) in the sub-
sequent discussion.
In their seminal paper on the identification of the local average treatment effect
(LATE), Imbens and Angrist (1994) (see also Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996) show
that ∆10 is point identified under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3. I.e., the bounds collapse
to a single point given that pi01 is equal to zero:
∆10 =
(
P1|1
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯1,1 −
P1|0
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,1
)
−
(
P0|0
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,0 −
P0|1
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯1,0
)
=
(P1|1 · Y¯1,1 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0)− (P1|0 · Y¯0,1 + P0|0 · Y¯0,0)
P1|1 − P1|0
=
Pr(D = 1|Z = 1) · E(Y |Z = 1, D = 1) + Pr(D = 0|Z = 1) · E(Y |Z = 1, D = 0)
Pr(D = 1|Z = 1)− Pr(D = 1|Z = 0)
− Pr(D = 1|Z = 0) · E(Y |Z = 0, D = 1) + Pr(D = 0|Z = 0) · E(Y |Z = 0, D = 0)
Pr(D = 1|Z = 1)− Pr(D = 1|Z = 0)
=
E(Y |Z = 1)− E(Y |Z = 0)
E(D|Z = 1)− E(D|Z = 0) .
The last equality gives the well known result that the ATE on the compliers is just
the ratio of two differences in conditional expectations, namely the intention to treat
effect divided by the share of compliers. Under monotonicity, the observed subgroup
with Z = 0 and D = 1 consists of always takers only and therefore, Y¯0,1 immediately
gives the mean potential outcome under treatment for the always takers. Thus, an op-
timization of the kind max
(
Y¯1,1(min |q111,1), Y¯0,1
)
and min
(
Y¯1,1(max |q111,1), Y¯0,1
)
(with
pi01 = 0) as it was used for the bounds in section 3.1 is not required here. Note, how-
ever, that this comparison gives a testable implication for the identifying assumptions.
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If it is satisfied, Y¯1,1(min |q111,1) ≤ Y¯0,1 ≤ Y¯1,1(max |q111,1), otherwise Z has a direct effect
on the outcomes of the always takers. Similarly, Y¯1,0 is the mean potential outcome
under non-treatment for the never takers. Therefore, another testable implication is
Y¯0,0(min |q000,0) ≤ Y¯1,0 ≤ Y¯0,0(max |q000,0). We refer to Huber and Mellace (2013b) for a
joint test of these implications.
In the absence of defiers, the bounds for the always takers and never takers (∆11
and ∆00) simplify to
∆UB11 = Y¯0,1 − yLB ,
∆LB11 = Y¯0,1 − yUB ,
and
∆UB00 = y
UB − Y¯1,0,
∆LB00 = y
LB − Y¯1,0.
These bound are sharp because E(Y |D = 1, T = 11) and E(Y |D = 0, T = 00) are now
point identified by Y¯0,1 and Y¯1,0 (if mean independence within strata holds). However,
monotonicity does not impose any restrictions on the distributions of Y |D = 0, T = 11
and Y |D = 1, T = 00 so that the worst case bounds yLB , yUB have to be assumed.
As in the last section, the bounds on the ATEs on the treated (∆D=1), the non-
treated (∆D=0), and the entire population (∆) can be expressed as functions of the
bounds on E(Y (1)) and E(Y (0)). In the online appendix we show that under mono-
tonicity,
E(Y (1))UB = P0|1 · yUB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1,
E(Y (1))LB = P0|1 · yLB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1,
E(Y (0))UB = P1|0 · yUB + P0|0 · Y¯0,0,
E(Y (0))LB = P1|0 · yLB + P0|0 · Y¯0,0,
so that the bounds on the various populations are given by
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∆UBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
P1|0 · yLB + Pr(Z = 1) · (P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆LBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
P1|0 · yUB + Pr(Z = 1) · (P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆UBD=0 =
P0|1 · yUB + Pr(Z = 0) · (P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
∆LBD=0 =
P0|1 · yLB + Pr(Z = 0) · (P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
and
∆UB = P0|1 · yUB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 · yLB − P0|0 · Y¯0,0,
∆LB = P0|1 · yLB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 · yUB − P0|0 · Y¯0,0.
Balke and Pearl (1997), Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), and Kitagawa (2009) show
that under monotonicity, their bounds on the ATE in the entire population coincide
with the bounds of Manski (1990), who only invokes mean independence in the entire
population. I.e., Assumption 3 does, if it is satisfied, not bring any additional identify-
ing power for ∆. Interestingly, this is also the case for our bounds on the ATEs on the
entire population, the treated, and the non-treated. As all these bounds are optimized
at pimin01 = max(0, P1|0 − P1|1) (at least for continuous outcomes), it follows under a
satisfaction of monotonicity that P1|1 − P1|0 ≥ 0 and therefore, pimin01 = 0. For this
reason, imposing the monotonicity assumption, which amounts to setting pi01 = pi
min
01 ,
does not further tighten the bounds if a defier proportion of zero is already a priori
consistent with the data.
3.3 Mean dominance
Mean dominance or the stronger stochastic dominance assumption have been used
in the sample selection framework by Zhang and Rubin (2003), Lechner and Melly
(2007), Blundell et al. (2007), Zhang et al. (2008), and Huber and Mellace (2013a).
We will show that mean dominance also bears identifying power in the IV framework.
Assumption 4:
E[Y (d)|T = 10] ≥ E[Y (d)|T = t] ∀ d ∈ {0, 1}, t ∈ {11, 00} (mean dominance).
Assumption 4 states that the mean potential outcomes of the compliers under treat-
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ment and non-treatment are at least as high as those of the always and never takers.
Note that the particular mean dominance assumption considered here is only one
out of many possible relations between the potential outcomes of various strata. Its
plausibility has to be judged in the light of the empirical application and theoretical
considerations. In Section 5, we present an example where the compliers are likely to
have weakly higher mean potential educational outcomes than both the always takers
and the never takers due to plausibly being more able and/or motivated on average.
As discussed in the next subsection, mean dominance has testable implications if it is
jointly assumed with monotonicity. In the application presented in Section 5 we will
test Assumption 4 and show that it is not rejected at any conventional significance
level.
The bounds on the ATEs in the various principal strata as well as among the
treated, non-treated, and entire populations are provided in the online appendix.
Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 4, online Appendix A.3.2 outlines the moment inequal-
ities that provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the defiers’ proportion pi01
being the identified set, denoted by P∗∗. The construction of the latter based on lin-
ear linear programming is presented in online Appendix A.3.1. Note that in general
P∗∗ ⊆ P∗ ⊆ P. Finally, we derive the bounds on the various ATEs as well as the
mean potential outcomes in online Appendix A.3.3.
3.4 Monotonicity and mean dominance
We subsequently derive the bounds under both monotonicity (Assumption 3) and
mean dominance (Assumption 4). Since ∆10 is point identified under Assumptions 1
to 3, Assumption 4 does not bring any further improvement w.r.t. the compliers. For
all other populations, the bounds become tighter when invoking both assumptions.
The upper and lower bounds of the ATE on the always takers are now
∆UB11 = Y¯0,1 − yLB ,
∆LB11 = Y¯0,1 −
(
P0|0
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,0 −
P0|1
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯1,0
)
.
As under mean dominance, the upper bound of the always takers’ mean potential
outcome under non-treatment cannot be higher than the compliers’ upper bound under
non-treatment. Furthermore, monotonicity implies that the latter is point identified
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by
P0|0
P1|1−P1|0 ·Y¯0,0−
P0|1
P1|1−P1|0 ·Y¯1,0. Again, ∆LB11 is sharp by Lemma 1 in online Appendix
A.3. Similarly, the bounds for the never takers tighten to
∆UB00 =
(
P1|1
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯1,1 −
P1|0
P1|1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,1
)
− Y¯1,0,
∆LB00 = y
LB − Y¯1,0.
By the monotonicity assumption,
P1|1
P1|1−P1|0 ·Y¯1,1−
P1|0
P1|1−P1|0 ·Y¯0,1 is the compliers’ mean
potential outcome under treatment. Under mean dominance, this is an upper bound
for the never takers’ mean potential outcome under treatment.
Under both monotonicity and mean dominance, the upper bounds of E(Y (0)) and
E(Y (1)) become
E(Y (1))UB = P0|1 ·
(
P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,1
P1|1 − P1|0
)
+ P1|1 · Y¯1,1,
E(Y (0))UB = P1|0 ·
(
P0|0 · Y¯0,0 − P0|1 · Y¯1,0
P1|1 − P1|0
)
+ P0|0 · Y¯0,0,
while the lower bounds are equivalent to those under monotonicity alone.
Therefore, the bounds on the ATEs on the treated, non-treated, and the entire
population are given by
∆UBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
P1|0 · yLB + Pr(Z = 1) · (P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆LBD=1 = E(Y |D = 1)−
P1|0 ·
(
P0|0·Y¯0,0−P0|1·Y¯1,0
P1|1−P1|0
)
+ Pr(Z = 1) · (P0|0 · Y¯0,0 + P0|1 · Y¯1,0)
Pr(D = 1)
,
∆UBD=0 =
P0|1 ·
(
P1|1·Y¯1,1−P1|0·Y¯0,1
P1|1−P1|0
)
+ Pr(Z = 0) · (P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
∆LBD=0 =
P0|1 · yLB + Pr(Z = 0) · (P1|0 · Y¯1,0 + P1|1 · Y¯1,1)
Pr(D = 0)
− E(Y |D = 0),
and
∆UB = P0|1 ·
(
P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 · Y¯0,1
P1|1 − P1|0
)
+ P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 · yLB − P0|0 · Y¯0,0,
∆LB = P0|1 · yLB + P1|1 · Y¯1,1 − P1|0 ·
(
P0|0 · Y¯0,0 − P0|1 · Y¯1,0
P1|1 − P1|0
)
− P0|0 · Y¯0,0.
As a final remark it is worth noting that under Assumptions 1 to 3, Assumption
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4 (mean dominance) has some testable implications. Recall that the always takers’
mean potential outcome is identified by Y¯0,1. Therefore, mean dominance of the
compliers can be tested by comparing Y¯0,1 and Y¯1,1, which also encounters compliers
and, therefore, has to dominate. Equivalently, Y¯1,0 is the never takers’ mean potential
outcome under non-treatment and must be dominated by Y¯0,0, which contains never
takers and compliers. The intuition is that since the mean potential outcome of the
always takers (never takers) is not affected by Z under mean independence within
strata, the observed mean outcome consisting of both compliers and always takers
(never takers) dominates the observed mean outcome of the always takers (never
takers) only. The respective null hypotheses to be tested are Y¯1,1 ≥ Y¯0,1 and Y¯0,0 ≥
Y¯1,0. See Section 5 for an application of mean dominance tests.
4 Estimation
Under Assumptions 1 to 3 or 1 to 4, estimators of the bounds can be constructed by
using the sample analogs of the bounds derived under the various assumptions, which
is straightforward. To this end, we define the following sample parameters:
Pˆ1|1 =
∑n
i=1Di · Zi∑n
i=1 Zi
, Pˆ0|1 = 1−
∑n
i=1Di · Zi∑n
i=1 Zi
, Pˆ1|0 =
∑n
i=1Di · (1− Zi)∑n
i=1(1− Zi)
,
Pˆ0|0 = 1−
∑n
i=1Di · (1− Zi)∑n
i=1(1− Zi)
, ˆ¯Y1,1 =
∑n
i=1 Yi ·Di · Zi∑n
i=1Di · Zi
, ˆ¯Y0,1 =
∑n
i=1 Yi ·Di · (1− Zi)∑n
i=1Di · (1− Zi)
,
ˆ¯Y1,0 =
∑n
i=1 Yi · (1−Di) · Zi∑n
i=1(1−Di) · Zi
, ˆ¯Y0,0 =
∑n
i=1 Yi · (1−Di) · (1− Zi)∑n
i=1(1−Di) · (1− Zi)
,
ˆ¯Yz,d(max |qtz,d) =
∑n
i=1 Yi · I{Di = d} · I{Zi = z} · I{Y ≥ yˆ1−qtz,d}∑n
i=1 I{Di = d} · I{Zi = z} · I{Y ≥ yˆ1−qtz,d}
,
ˆ¯Yz,d(min |qtz,d) =
∑n
i=1 Yi · I{Di = d} · I{Zi = z} · I{Y ≤ yˆqtz,d}∑n
i=1 I{Di = d} · I{Zi = z} · I{Y ≤ yˆqtz,d}
,
yˆqtz,d = min
{
y :
∑n
i=1Di · Zi · I{Yi ≤ y}∑n
i=1Di · Zi
≥ qtz,d
}
, yˆLB = min(Y ), yˆUB = max(Y ),
where I{·} is the indicator function. Using these expressions instead of the population
parameters in the various formulas for the bounds immediately yields feasible estima-
tors.
√
n-consistency and asymptotic normality of these estimators follow immediately
from the results of Lee (2009) and its discussion is, therefore, omitted.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 or 1, 2, and 4, however, estimation is non-standard due
to the presence of min/max and sup/inf operators. For example, the upper bound on
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the compliers under Assumptions 1 and 2 is constructed in two steps. First, the sharp
upper bound given pi01 is obtained as the minimum of the four possible combinations of
the pairs
(
Y¯1,1(min |q111,1), Y¯0,1(min |q110,1)
)
and
(
Y¯0,0(max |q000,0), Y¯1,0(max |q001,0)
)
, which
are both functions of Z. In the second step, the upper bound is derived by taking the
sup of the bound over pi01.
More general, denote by ∆LBt (pi01, z, z
′), ∆UBt (pi01, z, z
′)12 the upper and lower
bounds of any ∆t conditional on pi01, Z = z in the first min (max) operator and
Z = z′ in the second one. To simplify the exposition, we define
v =

1 if z = 1, z′ = 1
2 if z = 1, z′ = 0
3 if z = 0, z′ = 1
4 if z = 0, z′ = 0
.
This allows rewriting ∆LBt (pi01, z, z
′), ∆UBt (pi01, z, z
′) as ∆LBt (pi01, v), ∆
UB
t (pi01, v).
Then, the identification region of ∆t is obtained by optimizing over admissible values
of pi01 ∈ P∗ and v ∈ V = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
inf
pi01∈P∗
{max
v∈V
[∆LBt (pi01, v)]} ≤ ∆t ≤ sup
pi01∈P∗
{min
v∈V
[∆UBt (pi01, v)]}.
Hirano and Porter (2012) show that for parameters that are non-differentiable func-
tionals of the data (such as min/max and sup/inf operators), asymptotically unbiased
estimators do not exist. Therefore, the sample analog estimators of infpi01∈P∗{maxv∈V [∆LBt (pi01, v)]}
and suppi01∈P∗{minv∈V [∆UBt (pi01, v)]} may suffer from substantial bias. Similarly, the
usual estimators of the standard deviations of such sample analog estimators, which
are either based on asymptotic approximation or the bootstrap, produce confidence
regions with incorrect coverage probabilities. However, note that the biases on bounds
and confidence intervals induced by optimizing over the defier proportion and the in-
strument go in opposite directions. Taking the supremum (infimum) of the upper
(lower) bounds over pi01 yields overly conservative inference, while optimizing over Z
produces bounds and confidence intervals that are too tight.13 For this reason, we
12This section as well as in online Appendix A.7 focuses on bounds that contain two min/max operators.
If the bound contains only one min (max) operator, these expressions have to be replaced by ∆LBt (pi01, z),
∆UBt (pi01, z). Estimation is then analogous except that v = z and can therefore only take two (rather than
four) values.
13By optimizing over admissible defiers proportions P∗ (or P∗∗) we ignore the fact that P∗ is unknown
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ignore the first source of bias due to pi01, but account for the second one due to Z by
applying the method proposed in Chernozhukov et al. (2013) and also used in Chen
and Flores (2012). In this way we obtain conservative (and half-median-unbiased)
point estimates and confidence intervals for the bounds. The method is described in
online Appendix A.7.
5 Application
We apply the methods outlined in the last sections to a school voucher experiment
that was conducted within Colombia’s “Programa de Ampliacio´n de Cobertura de la
Educacio´n Secundaria” (PACES) in order to evaluate the program’s impact on the
educational achievement of various subpopulations. The PACES program targeted
low income families in Colombia and provided more than 125,000 pupils with vouchers
covering somewhat more than half the cost of private secondary schooling. Its goals
were, among others, to increase net enrollment rates in secondary education and to
raise quality compared to a public only educational system, see King et al. (1997).
We use a subsample of the data previously analyzed by Angrist et al. (2002) which
consists of 1201 pupils in the capital Bogota´ whose average age was 12 years when they
had applied for private school vouchers in 1995. After randomly (not) being offered a
voucher the applicants were re-interviewed in the second half of 1998 to measure the
outcome variables of interest such as the highest grade completed and whether grades
had to be repeated.
Table 4: Observed strata proportions
Conditional treatment probability estimate standard error
P1|1 = Pr(D = 1|Z = 1) 0.561 (0.020)
P0|1 = Pr(D = 0|Z = 1) 0.439 (0.020)
P1|0 = Pr(D = 1|Z = 0) 0.056 (0.010)
P0|0 = Pr(D = 0|Z = 0) 0.944 (0.010)
Let Z denote the random assignment indicator, Y a dummy for never repeating
a grade or the highest grade completed, respectively, and D whether private school-
ing was actually received. As shown in Table 4, compliance with the school voucher
assignment was not perfect. Only 56.1 % of the 629 pupils offered a school voucher
actually went to private schools, while 43.9 % did not. 94.4 % of the 583 pupils
and needs to be estimated in practice. Developing a statistical inference procedure that would account
for the sampling distribution of P∗ is, however, beyond the scope of the present paper, which focuses on
identification.
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that were randomized out did not receive private schooling, but 5.6 % attended pri-
vate schools anyway. Table 5 reports the estimated bounds on the strata proportions
without monotonicity and the respective point estimates under Assumption 3 (mono-
tonicity). In our application, P, the outer bounds on the proportion of defiers based on
the distribution of (D,Z) (given by (6)) coincide with the sharp bounds P∗ based on
the distribution of (Y,D,Z) under mean independence within principal strata, which
are obtained by linear programming as discussed in online Appendix A.1.1. They
also coincide with the sharp bounds P∗∗ under the additional assumption of mean
dominance, which are presented in online Appendix A.3.1.
Table 5: Estimated (bounds on the) proportions of latent strata
Latent strata Bounds without monotonicity Proportions under monotonicity
Always takers [0.000, 0.056] 0.056
Compliers [0.505, 0.561] 0.505
Never takers [0.383, 0.439] 0.439
Defiers [0.000, 0.056] -
We estimate bounds on the ATEs of the compliers, the always takers, the never
takers, the treated, and the total population under mean independence within strata,
mean dominance, and/or monotonicity. We do not consider defiers, because P = P∗
and Pˆ1|1 > Pˆ0|1 imply that the bounds for the defiers are not informative when only
invoking mean independence within strata. Furthermore, defiers are ruled out under
monotonicity (and under both monotonicity and mean dominance). Note that also
the bounds for the always takers are not informative under mean independence within
strata alone, because Pˆ1|0 < Pˆ0|1 such that the share of always takers is smaller than
the share of never takers. However, under monotonicity and/or mean dominance,
informative bounds can be obtained for this stratum.
Whenever optimization over the defier proportion is required,14 we use an equidis-
tant grid of 100 values between the minimum (0) and maximum (0.056) possible
shares. Under mean independence within strata and/or mean dominance (without
monotonicity), we apply the Chernozhukov et al. (2013) procedure (see the last sec-
tion) for estimation and inference (using a nominal significance level of 5%) using
5000 bootstraps and 200000 simulations.15 Under monotonicity (with and without
14This concerns the compliers and –due to the discreteness of the outcomes– also the treated and the
entire population under Assumptions 1 and 2, and all populations considered under Assumptions 1,2, and
4.
15We are indebted to Xuan Chen and Carlos Flores for providing us with their Matlab code imple-
menting the Chernozhukov et al. (2013) procedure and for their helpful advice about its implementa-
tion. As we have to estimate 100 variance-covariance matrices for each bound when optimizing over
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mean dominance), which implies that standard asympotics apply to the bounds, we
compute the 95% confidence intervals for the ATEs (rather than the bounds) based
on the method described in Imbens and Manski (2004):
(
∆ˆLBt − 1.645 · σˆLBt , ∆ˆUBt + 1.645 · σˆUBt
)
,
where ∆ˆLBt , ∆ˆ
UB
t are the estimated bounds in stratum t and σˆ
LB
t , σˆ
UB
t denote their
respective estimated standard errors,16 obtained from 5000 bootstrap replications.
Concerning the worst case bounds yUB and yLB , note that the binary outcome “never
repeating a grade” is naturally bounded between 0 and 1. For the highest grade
completed, we take the maximum and minimum values observed in the data, which
are 11 and 5 years of schooling, respectively.
Table 6: ATE estimates on “never repeating a grade” and confidence intervals
Assumptions Compliers Always takers Never takers Treated Entire pop.
Assumptions 1 and 2 only [0.072, 0.208] [-1.000, 1.000] [-0.783, 0.379] [0.044, 0.263] [-0.261, 0.253]
(0.000, 0.281) Not informative (-0.837, 0.426) (-0.010, 0.333) (-0.302, 0.286)
Mean dominance [0.071, 0.207] [-0.923, 0.966] [-0.785, 0.350] [0.045, 0.266] [-0.261, 0.255]
(0.005, 0.250) (-1.000, 0.981) (-0.811, 0.401) (-0.009, 0.333) (-0.302, 0.287)
Monotonicity 0.118 [-0.156, 0.844] [-0.684, 0.316] [0.070, 0.245] [-0.249, 0.245]
(0.032, 0.203) (-0.263, 0.951) (-0.730, 0.363) (0.010, 0.313) (-0.293, 0.277)
Both 0.118 [-0.011, 0.844] [-0.684, 0.289] [0.095, 0.245] [-0.241, 0.234]
(0.032, 0.203) (-0.138, 0.951) (-0.730, 0.340) (0.025, 0.313) (-0.287, 0.270)
Note: Bounds in square brackets and confidence intervals in round brackets. Confidence intervals are based on 5000 bootstraps.
The number of simulations for the half-median-unbiased estimators is 200000.
Table 6 presents the results for the outcome “never repeating a grade” after the
school voucher assignment under the various assumptions. The bounds of the ATE
estimates are given in square brackets, the 95% confidence intervals are in round
brackets. When only invoking Assumptions 1 and 2, the bounds are not informative
for the always takers and quite wide for the never takers and the entire population. For
the treated, the estimated interval is positive, but the lower bound is not significantly
different from zero. For the compliers, the set is significantly positive (on a nominal
level of 5%) and suggests that private schooling decreases the probability to repeat
a class by 7 to 21 percentage points. This result suggests that mean independence
within strata might have considerable identifying power in applications even when
other restrictions such as monotonicity do not appear plausible.
pi01 (one for each value of the grid), some of them are close to being singular. To overcome this
problem we use the Matlab function “mchol” by Brian Borchers (downloaded on Feb 06th 2013 from
http://infohost.nmt.edu/˜borchers/ldlt.html) for regularization.
16The confidence intervals apply to cases where the distance between the upper and lower bound
of the effect is bounded away from zero, see Stoye (2009). Under point identification (as for
the compliers under monotonicity), the conventional two-sided confidence intervals are to be used:(
∆ˆt − 1.96 · σˆt, ∆ˆt + 1.96 · σˆt
)
, where ∆ˆt, σˆt denote the point estimate of the effect and the estimated
standard error.
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Mean dominance slightly narrows the bounds for the always takers, which are
now informative, but all in all, the gains in identification are if anything modest. In
contrast, monotonicity of D in Z (such that defiers are ruled out) entails point iden-
tification of the ATE on the compliers. The positive and significant estimate implies
that grade repetition is reduced by roughly 12 percentage points when attending a
private school. Also the identification region of the ATE on the treated, which (from
a policy perspective) often represent the most interesting population, is now signifi-
cantly positive. When invoking both monotonicity and mean dominance, the lower
bound for the treated is tightened further. The identification regions for the always
takers, never takers, and the entire population shrink somewhat, too, but still include
the possibility of a zero effect.
Table 7 shows the estimates for the outcome “highest grade completed”. Under
Assumptions 1 and 2 alone, the estimated set for the ATE on the compliers posi-
tive and almost significant. It suggests that attending a private school increases the
highest grade completed on average by 0.15 to 0.56 years for this population. Mean
dominance does little to shrink the complier bounds. Under monotonicity, the point
estimate suggests that schooling is on average raised by a third of a year. When in-
voking both assumptions, also the ATE on the treated (between 0.29 and 0.76 years)
is significantly positive. Even the identification region for the always takers is larger
than zero, but the effect is not significant at the 5 % level. All in all, our results
support the conclusion of Angrist et al. (2002) that pupils going to private schools
benefited from higher educational attainment. We find economically important posi-
tive effects on the likelihood not to repeat grades and on the highest grade completed
among the compliers, but also among the treated population. The latter result is
particularly relevant, because it suggests that the program increases the outcomes of
those actually participating, a group that is most likely of more policy interest than
the latent population of compliers.
Table 7: ATE estimates on “highest grade completed” and confidence intervals
Assumptions Compliers Always takers Never takers Treated Entire pop.
Assumptions 1 and 2 only [0.149, 0.562] [-6.000, 6.000] [-2.512, 4.019] [-0.353, 0.760] [-1.026, 1.984]
(-0.008, 0.721) Not informative (-2.627, 4.248) (-0.562, 0.952) (-1.155, 2.143)
Mean dominance [0.155, 0.549] [-2.007, 3.012] [-2.513, 1.019] [0.037, 0.810] [-0.866, 0.734]
(-0.001, 0.640) (-2.624, 3.037) (-2.576, 1.121) (-0.084, 0.988) (-0.984, 0.806)
Monotonicity 0.326 [-3.188, 2.813] [-2.251, 3.749] [-0.287, 0.760] [-1.002, 1.968]
(0.126, 0.526) (-3.457, 2.967) (-2.362, 3.987) (-0.506, 0.940) (-1.133, 2.127)
Both 0.326 [0.115, 2.813] [-2.251, 0.773] [0.289, 0.760] [-0.818, 0.661]
(0.126, 0.526) (-0.112, 2.967) (-2.362, 0.889) (0.122, 0.940) (-0.943, 0.746)
Note: Bounds in square brackets and confidence intervals in round brackets. Confidence intervals are based on 5000 bootstraps.
The number of simulations for the half-median-unbiased estimators is 200000.
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As mentioned in Section 3.4, mean dominance of the compliers’ potential outcomes
has testable implications if monotonicity holds. We therefore bootstrap the sample
analogs of E[Y (1)|T = 10] − E[Y (1)|T = 11] and E[Y (0)|T = 10] − E[Y (0)|T =
00] (with E[Y (1)|T = 10] = P1|1·Y¯1,1−P1|0·Y¯0,1P1|1−P1|0 , E[Y (0)|T = 10] =
P0|0·Y¯0,0−P0|1·Y¯1,0
P0|0−P0|1 ,
E[Y (1)|T = 11] = Y¯0,1, and E[Y (0)|T = 00] = Y¯1,0) to test whether the respective
mean potential outcome of the compliers dominates that of the always takers under
treatment and that of the never takers under non-treatment.17 Table 8 reports the
mean potential outcomes of the various populations and the p-values of the tests. The
results strongly support the mean dominance of the compliers over the always takers
under treatment and the mean dominance of the compliers over the never takers under
non-treatment.
However, strictly speaking we also have to test whether the compliers dominate the
always takers under non-treatment and the never takers under treatment, respectively.
Even though this is infeasible (because always takers are never observed under non-
treatment just as never takers under treatment), the mean potential outcomes provide
indirect evidence that these assumptions are most likely satisfied. First of all, the
hypothesis that the mean potential outcome of the compliers under non-treatment
dominates the mean potential outcome of the always takers under treatment cannot
be rejected for either outcome. I.e., if the ATE on the always takers is either positive
or at least not negative by a sufficiently large amount, the mean potential outcome of
the always takers under non-treatment cannot be larger than that of the compliers.
Furthermore, the never takers can only have a higher mean potential outcome under
treatment than the compliers if the ATE on the former is substantially larger than that
on the latter (as the mean potential outcome of the never takers under non-treatment
is considerably lower than that of the compliers for both outcome variables). In this
case, however, it seems irrational of the never takers not to take the treatment such
that this scenario appears unlikely.
Given the results of the tests, the question arises under which circumstances it
seems plausible that the compliers’ mean educational achievement dominates those of
17Of course, this approach tests mean dominance conditional on the satisfaction of Assumptions 2 and
3 and is otherwise a joint test of all three assumptions. Huber and Mellace (2013b) suggest tests (i) for
Assumptions 2 and 3 alone and (ii) (as also Kitagawa, 2013) for full independence of the instrument and
potential treatments/outcomes and Assumption 3. For the outcome “never repeating a grade”, using the
method of Chen and Szroeter (2014) (with a normal smoothing function and
√
n/2 log(log(n)) as tuning
parameter for the selection of binding moments) to test (i) and (ii) (with two equidistant probability
measures) yields p-values of 1.000 and 0.999, respectively. For “highest grade completed”, the respective
p-values are 0.993 and 0.851. Therefore, our data provide no evidence for a violation of (i) or (ii).
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Table 8: Mean potential outcomes and mean dominance tests
never repeating a grade highest grade completed
E[Y (1)|T = 10] 0.973 8.024
E[Y (0)|T = 10] 0.855 7.698
E[Y (1)|T = 11] 0.844 7.813
E[Y (0)|T = 00] 0.684 7.251
p-value for H0 : E[Y (1)|T = 10] ≥ E[Y (1)|T = 11] 0.964 0.975
p-value for H0 : E[Y (0)|T = 10] ≥ E[Y (0)|T = 00] 0.997 0.998
p-value for H0 : E[Y (0)|T = 10] ≥ E[Y (1)|T = 11] 0.559 0.211
Note: p-values of mean dominance tests are based on 1999 bootstraps.
the always and never takers. Suppose that the private schooling decision is a function
of (monetary and non-monetary) costs and utility coming from educational achieve-
ment. Economic theory suggests that rational households should send their children
to private schools only if the expected utility is at least as high as the costs. Always
taker households may get a relatively higher utility from education, e.g., because the
parents are themselves better educated and, therefore, appreciate education more than
the compliers. Furthermore, they may represent the more wealthy households (as they
send their children to private schools even without vouchers) such that their relative
costs for schooling are lower. This might again be correlated with parental education.
Both increased utility and lower relative costs will give relatively more pupils with
lower potential outcomes –related to lower ability and/or motivation– the chance to
receive private schooling. This line of argumentation is supported by the data, which
also contain information on father’s and mother’s education and the possession of
phone, which may be regarded as a proxy for wealth. The means of these variables
(which were measured before the assignment) are higher among always takers than
among compliers and the differences are significant at the 10 % level.18
In contrast, mean parental education and possessing a phone does not significantly
differ between the never takers and compliers. Given that they face similar utilities
(for a particular level of education) and relative costs as the compliers, it is plausible
that the never taker households did not respond to the vouchers because their kids
were probably less motivated and/or able and for this reason their expected returns
to private schooling were too small. This suggests that the never takers’ ATE (and
the mean potential outcomes) is lower than those of the compliers, as never taker
households were not even willing to pay less than half of the cost of private schooling
(recall that the vouchers did not cover the entire expenses).
18The test statistics are available from the authors upon request.
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6 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the question of what can be learnt about the average treat-
ment effects (ATE) on various populations under endogeneity/noncompliance when a
valid instrumental variable (IV) is at hand that satisfies mean independence within
strata and ignorable assignment. Since the work by Imbens and Angrist (1994) it
is well known that a local ATE (LATE) on the compliers (who take the treatment
if instrumented, but do not otherwise) is point identified under monotonicity of the
treatment in the instrument. Even though point identification is not feasible for
other groups, we show that informative bounds can be obtained for the always takers
(treated irrespective of the instrument), the never takers (not treated irrespective of
the instrument), the treated, the non-treated, and the entire population. We also
investigate the identifying power of mean dominance of the potential outcomes of the
compliers over those of the always takers and never takers.
The main contribution is the derivation of sharp bounds on the ATE of various
populations under monotonicity, mean dominance, and under both assumptions. We
also present an application to Colombia’s “Programa de Ampliacio´n de Cobertura
de la Educacio´n Secundaria”, which provided pupils from low income families with
vouchers for private secondary schooling, using experimental data previously analyzed
by Angrist et al. (2002). We find (on top of the complier effect) a significantly positive
ATE on the educational achievement of the treated population, a group of major policy
interest. As valuable “by-products” of our identification results we also obtain testable
implications of the validity of the instrument and of mean dominance, respectively.
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